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Philosophical l'heories of Metaphor 
Peter LAMARQUE 
I. Prelirninaries 
A brief survey of academic disciplines soon reveals the widespread and diverse 
interest in the theory of metaphor. Those disciplines where language itself is at the 
centre of attention， notably linguistics and literary criticism， inevitably come to enquire 
about the workings of metaphor. Theoretical Iinguists wi1l seek explanations for the 
prevalence of metaphor iηspoken language and how this relates to shifts of meaning 
and idiomatic usage; they wi11 a1so attempt to classify ranges of metaphor in particular 
areas of discourse.1 Literary critics wilI explore the use of poetic metaphors in literary 
works to show how an author is able to express and develop the most subtle ideas and 
emotions through figurative language.2 
Other disciplines have their own special concerns. Cognitive psychologists will look 
at the role 01' metapbor in langllage learning and in perception.3 Political scientists will 
pllrsue the impact of metaphor on political rhetoric and indeed might refiect on the 
integral part it plays in .their own theorizing:‘the body politic，' the‘organic' theory of 
society， and so on.4 Anthropologists， not to mention theologians， wiU often be in dispute 
over the appropriateness of a figurative as against a literal interpret叫ionof the texts 
and beliefs they examine.5 Science of a1 kinds is imblled with metaphorical language 
and it has been argued that metaphors play a crucial role in scientific hypotheses， so 
much so that whole researcb programmes can sometimes be thought of as attempts to 
explicate particlllarly fertile metaphors (e. g. the mind is a computer).6 In art history 
and aesthetics the idea of visual metaphor is at the heart of our understanding of aes-
thetic perception.7 
No general or philosophical theory of metaphor can hope to do justice to the detailed 
issues that arise in a1 these different academic contexts， certainly where these involve 
empirical investigation of particular metaphors. Bu t philosophy can hope to tackle cer-
tain fundamentals and to provide a general perspective on the subject. The basic phil-
osophical issue can perhaps best be encapsulated in the Kantian-type question: how is 
metaphorical expression possible? We will return to this question later. A number of 
subsidiary questions soon fal into line. One concerns the irredllcibility of metaphor in 
our speech and thought. Is metaphor an integral and unavoidable part of human ex-
pression or is it no more than a type of decoration or shortcut? Can thoughts them-
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selves-our mental representations of the world-be metaphorical? What， llltimately， is
the point of metaphorical expression? 
It is theories relating to questions such as these that the paper seeks to investigate. 
It is a reasonable hope that this investigation will make sorne contribution to the con制
cerns of other disciplines. 
I. Traditional hostility to metaphor 
The crux of what Plato called the ‘ancient war' between poets and philosophers 
concerned the correct path to truth. Who can provide the deepest llnclerstanding of 
man and nature? 1s it the philosopher with his abstract reasoning or the poet with his 
keen eye and imagination? Plato favollrecl the philosophical path thinking that poetry 
was a forrn of cleceit which ought to be banishecl from any well-orderec1 republic. 
Metaphor is a farniliar battlegrouncl for this ancient war. Philosophers hostile to 
rnetaphor have often taken their stancl in the name of trllth. Metaphorical ancl poetic 
language， they arglle， isthe langllage of rhetoric and as sllch cleals i口 ilusion ancl clecei t.
1n contrast， philosophical ancl scientific language is the langllage of argurnent and re帽
asoning; it alone heralcls the way to knowleclge ancl truth. 
John Locke is particularly severe: 8 
. . ifwe would speak of things as they are， we must allow that al the art of rhetoric， be-
sides orcler ancl clearness， al the artificial ancl figUl・ativeapplication of worcls eloquence 
hath inventecl， are for nothing else but to insinuate wro口gicleas， move the passions， ancl 
thereby misleacl the judgment， ancl so inclecl are perfect cheats， aロd，therefore， however 
laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues ancl popular ac!clresses， they 
are certainly， in a1 cliscourses that pretencl to inform or instruct， wholly to be avoic!ec!， and 
where truth ancl knowleclge are concernecl， cannot but be thought a g1'eat fault， either of 
the language or person that makes use of them. 
Ancl we find the sarne hostility in Hobbes: 9 
1n Demonstration， in Councell， ancl al rigorous search of Truth， ]ucJgement does al; except 
sometimes the understanc!ing have neecl to be openecl by some apt similitucle; ancl then 
there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors， they are in this case utterly excluclecl. 
For seeing they openly professe cleceipt; to aclmit them into Councell， 01' Reasoning， were 
manifest foly. 
The sharecl， and pllritanical， assllmption here is that if something is worth saying it is 
worth saying plainly ancl withollt ornarnent. Truth needs no ernbellishrnent. The mes-
sage， which has often resoundecl through the history of philosophy， is that philosophers 
ShOllld beware of rhetoric; ancl the first step is the banishrnent of metaphor. Metaphor 
is not merely a sllperftuolls ornament， itis also a sLlre sign of intellectual dishonesty. 
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II. Metaphorical language as a subject for philosophical analysis 
The rise of linguistic philosophy in the 20tb Century， under which language itself 
becomes a focus of pbilosophical interest， has encouraged a detente in the ancient war. 
Poetic and metaphorical langllage is no longer dismissed as inherently deceitful and in-
deed bas emerged in its own right as a subject for philosophical analysis， and respect. 
What is the basis for the philosophical interest in metaphor? When the poet asks 
‘Shall 1 compare thee to a summer's day ?' and elaborates 'Thou art more lovely and 
more temperate' the philosopher has no professional concern. Comparisons， for the 
philosopher， are neither odious nor problematic. To say that one thing is like something 
else might be to speak vaguely but otherwise it presents no theoretical puzzle. The 
conditions lInder which a comparison can be judged true or false are more or less clearly 
recognized; and the words retain their standard meanings. 
But when the poet says: 
1n me thou seest the glowing of such fire 
Tbat on the ashes of his youth does lye 
As the deathbed， whereon it must expire 
the pbi日10sopがhe町r必セ prof白es部siona討1a抗t旬er以1託凶tionis engaged. The poet's sentence is puzzling not 
because it is not comprehensible but precisely becallse it is comprehensible. This brings 
us back to the Kantian-type question: how is metaphorical expression possible? More 
specifically， how can we extract meaning from a sentence which so starkly violates 
simple and known semantic rules? To speak of Time， as Shakespeare does， as a‘bloody 
tyrant' or of Love， as Cowley does， as‘basking in sunny eyes' is on one level to utter 
manifest nonsense. Yet on another， recognizable， level it is to say things the sense of 
which， without too much e汀ort，can be grasped and accepted. How is the comprehen-
sion of metaphors possible? Why is it that some but not al semantic violations can 
acquire a meaning? Is it possible， as the poets in the ancient war thought， that meta嶋
phors can convey a special sort of meaning and even a special 80rt of truth? 
It is these questions abollt the linguistic peculiarities of metaphor which are the 
starting point for philosophical theories of metaphor. 1 am going to look at two general 
types of theories， ¥vhich 1 shall label ‘emotive' and‘cognitive，' which until recently 
have served to de白lethe parameters of the problems. 1 will extract from them what 
1 take to be their central insights. Then at the end， drawing on more recent develop-
ments in the philosophy of language， 1 will propose in outline a view of metaphor which 
departs radically from this frame¥vork but which nonetheless incorporates the insights 
of the earlier approaches. 
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IV. Emotive theories 
Emotive theories 1 associate with the empiricist tradition c1eriving from John Locke. 
More recent proponents are the Logical Positivists of the 1920s anc1 1930s. The most 
general claim of emotive theories is this: that metaphors serve not to describe facts but 
to arOLlse feelings. Locke's objection I;vas precisely that arousing feelings has no place 
in the serious pursllit of truth. 
Emotive theories might take c1i百erentforms varying no c10ubt in the degree of 
hostility or benevolence towards their sllbject.10 1 will concentrate 0口 aversion w hich 
broaclly coulcl be characterized as logical positivist， and which is also， 1 suppose， bene-
volently c1isposec1. This version， ¥vhich has been appliec1 variously to poetry， ethics anc1 
metaphysics， has two basic premises: 
(1) a distinction between two functions of language; anc1 
(2) the Verification Principle of Meaning. 
Language， accorcling to 1 A Richarcls， has a c1escriptive anc1 an emotive function， 
the former ch訂正:teristicof science， the latter of poetry; that is， Ollr primary intentions 
in using language might clifer， now to state facts， now to arouse feelings.11 
The Verification Princip1e of Meaning 0百ersa criterion for a meaningful clescriptive 
use of language. If a statemeηt is not empirically verifiable， i.e. testable by observation 
or experiment， or analytic， i.e. true or false entirely in virtue of the meanings of its 
constituent elements， then it is meaningless. H it is meaningless it is either completely 
wmthless or it rnust be seen as perform出ga口 emotiverather than a clescripti，ぽ func崎
tion. 
Metaphorical statements， according to this view， are not empirically ver泊able;no 
cognitive meaning caηresicle in a statement that violates semantic categories. At best 
the value or purpose of such a violation must lie in its emotive force. Here is an ex-
ample. The expression‘ashes of the I1re' has a straightforもiVarclcognitive meaning 
subject to conclitions of application-based on what is observable-that are known to 
anyone who knows the language. The expression‘ashes of.. YOllth，' however， isin 
breach of the stanclard conclitions of application of both 'ashes' and ‘youth.' Empirical 
veriιcation of propositions containing this expression is blockecl. Our focLls of attention， 
according to ernotive theories， isthus rec1irectecl to the ernotive import of the words. 
Associations of ashes，日re，108S， clestruction， and so on， become justaposecl with OLlr 
thoughts of youth and age. 
Monroe Bearclsley offers another exarnple of how this shift from the clescriptive to 
the ernotive register occurs: 
. . . the sharpness of a knife can be testecl by varioLl5 means， 50 that the phrase "sharp 
knife" is mea口ingful. ¥Ye may also suppose that "sharp" has some negative emotive 
import， cleriving fr喝omour experience with sharp things. Now， when we speak of a "sharp 
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razor" or a“sharp drill，" the emotive import is not active， because these phrases are mean-
ingfuJ. But when we speak of a "shafjコwind，"a "sharp dealer，" or a "sharJコtongue，"the 
tests for sharpness cannot be appJied， and therefore， though the individual words are mean-
ingful， the combinations of them are not. 1n this way the emotive import of the adjective 
is reJeased and intensified.J2 
A common theme of emotive theories of metaphor is that only literal language 
(which on this version means descriptive and verifiable language) ca口 strictlyspeaking 
be meaningful; metaphorical language works not through meaning bllt through cause 
and e百ect. ThllS it is not strictly co1'rect to speak of understanding a metaphor. 
Rather we should speak of a metaphor working 01' succeeding. It works if it e1icits 
the approp1'iate emotive response. Emotive theories hold that there is no metaphorical 
meaning to be grasped， nor any propositional or representational content. For this re-
aso日 metapho1'ical statements cannot be described as t1'ue 01' false. Nor do they in 
themselves advance krtowledge. 1 say‘in themselves' because metaphors， on this view， 
might well be attributed the callsal power of getting us to see things more clearly 01' 
of coming to frame true propositions which othe1'wise we might not have been able to 
do. But truth and knowledge are in this way at best only a by-product of metaphor; 
they are not its primary purpose or achievement.13 
Over the last thirty years logical positivism has come under perhaps fatal attack. 
Both tbe premises of the emotive theory under discussion， namely， the distinction be-
tween emotive and descriptive functions of language， and the Veri五cationPrinciple of 
Meaning， have been challenged. Thus it has often been pointed out that so-called de-
scriptive language nearly always has some emotive charge; and indeed that metaphorical 
langllage often has no more emotive charge than the most prosaic of ‘scientific' lan-
guage. The Verification Principle is most commonly challenged on the grounds that it 
fails to satisfy its own criterion of meaningflllness. 
Nevertheless， 1 think there are fundamental insiσhts i口 emotive tbeories whicb b 
ought to be retained even after the demise of logical positivism. The central idea that 
metaphors work more by eliciting attitudes than by describing states of affairs seems 
to contain an important element of trutb. After aIl， it is often difficult to identify any 
clear propositional content in a metaphorical statement， as is evident when we try to 
assess whether such a statement is true or false. Truth-assessment only seems possible 
¥Then we have translated the metaphor into some literal expression. Emotive tbeories 
avoid having to appeal to a special sort of metaphorical meaning or trutb. Also， they 
take metapbors seriollsly in that they do not try to eliminate them in favour of some 
non-metaphorical substitute， for example， a corresponding simile. A special function is 
assigned to metaphorical language and each metaphor， vvith its power to elicit a complex 
yet specific set of attitudes， is deemed unique and unparaphrasalコle.
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v. Cognitive theories 
In contrast to emotive theories are cognitive theories. These display an even 
greater diversity but the main general contention is this: that metaphors can be a ve-
hicle for meaning and truth. According to cognitive theories， metaphors can be attri-
buted a descriptive， propositional content， assessable as true or false. 
Max Black， in his seminal paper on metaphor published in 1955，1.1 was perhaps the 
flrst philosopher to turn the tide against the earlier， positivist non-cognitive theories. 
On Black's account， the terms in a metaphorical expression are said to inferαa to create 
a new， metaphorical， meaning which goes beyond the literal meaning of any of the 
co立lponentterms. 
This interaction theory rests on a clistinction between the 1iteral meaning of a worcl 
ancl a set of commonplace beliefs about what the word refers to. Here is Black's ex-
ample: 
Consider the statemen t‘Man is a wolf.' Here， we may say， are two sLlbjects-the principal 
subject Man (or: men) and the subsidiary subject， Wolf (or: wolves). Now the metaphorical 
sentence in question will not convey its intendecl meaning to a reacler sufficiently ignorant 
about wolves. What is neeclecl is not so much that the reader shal1 know the standarcl 
dictionary meaning of 'wolf '-01' be able to use that worcl in literal senses-as that he sha11 
know what 1 will cal the system 01 associated commonρlaces. Imagine some layman requirecl 
to say， without taking special thought， those things he helcl to be true about wolves; the 
set of statements resulting woulcl approximate to what 1 am here calling the system of 
commonplaces associated with the word ‘wolf.' . . • Ifthe man is a wolf， he preys upon 
other animals， isfierce， hungry， engaged in constant struggle， a sca venger， and so on. Each 
of these implied assertions has now to be macle to fit the principal subject (the man) either 
in no1'mal 01' abnormal senses. .. A suitable hearer will be lecl by the wolf-system of im-
plications to construct a corresponcling system of implications about the p1'incipal subject.I(. 
Thus it is， on Black's theory， that a new metaphorical meaning results from the Inter-
action of the wolf-system of associations with the principal subject， i. e. man. 
The distinction between the literal meaning of a worcl and the system of common-
place beliefs associatecl with it is common to many versions of cognitive theories. 
Monroe Bearclsley bases his own cognitive theory， which he has clevelopecl and refined 
over several articles，16 on a distinction between (a) the characteristics designαted by a 
word ancl (b) the characteristics connofed by a worcl. The clesignatecl characteristics 
are those that c1efine the worc1 while the connoted characteristics are simply those widely 
thought to belong to many of the things the word denotes. When the clesignated 
characteristics are seen to be inapplicable， as in a metaphorical Llse， we turn to the 
connotations. It is the interaction of connotations that gives birth to a new meaning. 
Beardsley sometimes calls his theory a 'conversion theory' by which he means 
that the senses of terms get altered， or convertec1， in metaphorical combinations. Thus 
to say that ‘Time is a tyrant' is， on Beardsley's view， to alter the sense of both‘Time' 
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and ‘tyrant.' The connotations 01' commonplace beliefs about tY1'ants-that they are 
ruthless， arbitrary， unforg討ing，without feeling， etc.-stretch and a1ter the literal sense 
of the word; while at the same time the abstract cha1'acteristics literally associated with 
‘Time' give way to the personalized cha1'acteristics deriving from the connotations of 
‘tyrant.' The metaphorical combination has created a new semantic or propositional 
content， which in turn can be assessed for truth 01' falsity. We must ask ollrselves 
whether time can truly be conceived in this way. 
¥Vhether we cal tbis process‘interaction，' 'interanimation，' 'conversion，' 'tension，' 
or whatever，17 the common thought behind cognitive theories is the same， namely that 
metaphorical meaning is a property acqllired by an expression when literal interpretation 
of that expression a汀ordsno acceptable 1'eading. 
VI. Comparison and assessment of emotive and cognitive theories 
For al their di仔erences，there seems to be a common structure behind both emotive 
and cognitive theories. Both start from the premise that a literal reading or interpreta-
tion is ‘blocked，' either by a failure of veri五abilityor by the inapplicability of the literal 
senses of the worc1s. According to emotive theories this‘blocking' encourages (and is 
the cause of) a cbaracteristic a百ectiveresponse， while according to cognitive theories it 
creates a new semantic content through the interaction of connotations. 
But there are major shortcomings in both types of theory. First of al， emotive 
theories leave no room for a rational response to metaphor， that is， for a reasonec1 anc1 
argued inte1'pretation of metaphors allowing us to speak of correct or incorrect inter-
pretations. They admit only tbe reactive side of our response， aηa百ectivereaction 
triggered by a causal stimulus. Bl1t in practice metaphorical interpretation is a great 
deal more ordered than that. However varied a pureγθaction to a metaphor， there are 
definite constraints on what is acceptable as an intenウretation. T'he reasoned p1'ocedures 
of poetic criticism w0111d not be possible witbout sllch constraints. 
Cognitive theories do allow for rights and wrongs in the explication of metaphors; 
there is at least some degree of objectivity in what COllnts as a 'connotation' or 
， commonplace belief.' However， a major problem faces theories like Black's or Beardsley's : 
bow is the transfer of connotations from subsic1iary to principal subjects to be carried 
Ol1t? Wheηwe transfer the connotations of tyrant to time or ashes to YOllth or even 
wolf to man we are nearly always going to involve ourselves in further metaphors. 
Let lS suppose tbat tY1'ants are commonly believed to be egocentric， psychopathic， and 
wantonly cruel. Vif e can only apply these epithets to the abstract concept of time 
metathorically. Time is not literally egocentric. It seems we have to explain one met仕
phor only by producing another. W一hatis more， itis hard to see hO¥^l we are ever 
going to und connotations of ‘tyrant' ¥vhich "vil transfer non-metaphoricaJly to Time. 
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But if we can口otfind sllch then， 0口Bearclsley'saCCollnt， we haven't grasped the meta船
phorical meaning ancl areロobetter of establishing the trllUトconclitions. What originally 
looked like a straightforward proceclure for extracting a new 'interactive' sense now 
100ks nearly impossib1e to plt into e百ect.
1 sllggest that a new approach is neeclecl that bui1ds on the strengths of the emotive 
and cognitive theories but by蜘passesthese problems. Emotive theories are righ t to 
stress the imaginative component in the interpretation of metaphor but wrong to see 
ollr response as merely causecl without being reasonecl. Cognitive theories are right to 
stress the systematic ancl constrained natllre of metaphorical interpretation but wrong to 
see metaphor as creating a specia1 sort of meaning or propositiona1 content. 
Both theories are wroロg，1 think， to take as their point of cleparture a paracligm of 
meaning associated with the semantic notions of reference and truth. On emotive 
theories metaphor is relegated to the‘emQtive function of 1anguage' in virtue of its 
fai1ure to meet the standards of reference and verification clemanded of the paradigmatic 
'descriptive function of 1anguage.' On cognitive theories metaphor is brought into line 
with the semantic paradigm ancl cll1y assignecl tru th conclitions by having the status of 
， connotations' and ‘commonplace beliefs' raised to the level of (metaphorical) meaning. 
VII. Metaphor in a theory of .'communication-intention 
1 propose that we view metaphor not as belonging to a theory of semantics， where 
the above paracligm of meaning is upheld， but in a theory of commllnication-intention. 
Metaphor is best treated not as a semantic property of langllage but as a pragmatic 
property of language use. It is neither stimulus (emotive theories) nor propositional 
content (cognitive theories); it is rather aロintentionalact governecl by constitutive rules. 
1n what follows 1 will very briefl.y sketch the outline of a theory which has commllni-
cation-intention， not semantics， as its basis. 
The funclamental clistinction 0口 sucha theory is not that between emotive ancl 
cognitive meaning bllt between whatαsentence meαns (in a langllage) ancl uぬαta sβeaker 
meαns (in a particlllar lltterance). This clistinction is best illustratecl by irony or ironic 
lltterance， which 1 think is the nearest relative to metaphor. 
Consicler the sentence: 
(A) That was a clever thing to clo. 
The meaning of (A) in the langllage is cleterminecl by the meanings of its component 
worcls; for example， 'clever' means 'intelligent， sensible， wise，' ancl so on. However， 
(A) coulcl be utterecl iηa particular context， c， such that a speaker means: 
(B) That was a stupicl thing to do. 
The utterance of (A) in context c isironic. By speaking ironically a speaker can lltter 
(A) ancl mean (B). But the meaning of (B) is not a semantic property of (A); 'stupicl' 
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could never be i1c1uded correctly in a list of meanings f01・'c1ever.' The gap here 1S 
between what the speaker said and what the speaker 111eant. 11 context c the speaker 
did not mean what he said. Metaphor， 1 suggest， or strictly metaphorical utterance， is 
another example of not meaning what you say. It belongs in a family of cases which 
as well as irony includes hyperbole， insinuation and hinting.18 
Being metaphorical， like being ironic lS a property of utterances (what a speaker 
111eans) not of sentences. One c011sequence of this is that strictly speaking there are no 
metaphors i1 a language. There are on1y sentences or expressions with g1'eate1' or less 
potential to be used as metaphors. Those who hold that metaphor is a linguistic or 
se111antic pl・ope1'ty(like t1'ansitivity 01' synonymity) are hard put to identify those se-
mantic cha1'acte1'istics了equi1'edof metaphors; it is like 100king for the semantic 1'equire-
ments of an i1'onic expression 01' of a lint. The favourite candidate， which we have 
seen cited in both emotive and cognitive theories， issemantic anoma1y 01' the violation 
of semantic catego1'ies， as occu1's in ‘ashes of youth' 01・ 'Timeis a tY1'ant.' 
But it seems that semantic anomaly is neithe1' a necessary not a sufficient condition 
for an utte1'ance to be rretaphorical. On the one hand， itis not necessary because many 
sentences (or exp1'essions) ¥vith a quite straightforwa1'd literal meaning and no semantic 
a日oma1yC3n be used metaphorica11y in pa1'ticular contexts; for example，‘Tbat house 
needs sp1'ing-cleaning' or (The rats are stil inside.' 1ndeed some sentences can be used 
simultaneously both Jretaphorically and ¥'Iith thei1' litera1 meaning:‘Moscow is a cold 
city' or‘John went in at the deep e1d.' On the other h8nd， semantic anom号1yis not a 
suf日cientcondition for a n~etapborica1 use because we need to marl王 adistinction be-
tween making a metaphor and making a mistake. Not just any violation of a semantic 
category can count as a metaphor. The chi1d who says‘Tbe ftower is clever' or‘The 
moon told me to go to sleep' is not automatically to be interpreted metaphorically. 
Utterances of these sentences might be i11tended literally and rest on mistaken beliefs 
about ftowers and the moon. 
So what makes an utterance metaphorica1? First of a1， the identification of meta-
phOl・ica1utterance (though， as we sha11 see， not necessari日1ythe IηneαnI1ηzg of that u tter-
311ce) mηlUS坑tr児膚でefe引r局 bコa舵cktωo t口1eut口:1土terer喝.'s
used mη1ight bコea good indication of a speakelγ.'s ilη1te1tions but it is not the determining 
factor in metap11or. 1n using an expression metapborically 3 speaker intends， as in 
every other meaningful utterance， to pl・oc1ucea response in a 11earer. But he inte11c1s 
to produce that response not through a purely causal mechanism， as suggested by emo-
tive theories， but through rational means iηthe se口setl1at tl1e hearer is intended to 
respond because he recognize that that is what the speaker intends him to do.1G 
The primary intention behind at least cre3tive 01' 110vel metaphors is not that a 
hearer shoulc1 believe something， I.e. accept the truth of a proposition， but tbat he should 
do something. The utterance， correct]y interpreted， isto be viewed as an invitation to 
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undertake an imaginative and intellectual task. This is the crllcial point behind meta剛
phorical l1tterance. vVe are being invitecl to attempt in as many ways as we can to 
imagine 01' conceive of one thing (the tenor， to use 1 A Richards' term) throllgh icleas 
ancl concepts connectecl with something else (the vehicle) often of a quite different logi-
cal type. This imaginative ancl intellectual task， which 1 sha11 call the‘metaphorical 
proceclllre，' willηo clOllbt follow l1111ch the same lines as clescribecl in the cognitive ac-
counts of Black ancl Bearclsley; in other・ worcls，appeal will be macle to 'systems of 
commonplaces' ancl ‘connotations.' Bl1 t once we get ricl of the iclea of a specia 1 meta輔
phorical meaning acquirecl by a sentence through the interaction of its terms， the neecl 
to resolve the cognitivists' problem of how to transfer connotations non情metaphorically
is less pressing. The metaphorical proceclure is not restrictecl to f-incling predicates com国
patible with tenor and vehicle; insteacl it will freely invoke l1any cli旺erentkincls of 
mental aicls， the imagination， mental imagery， analogies， ancl so on. The proceclure neecl 
not involve lingllistic expression. 
Another aclva目age~of this 'invitation' view of metaphor over the cognitivist view 
is that it cloes not presuppose that there mllst always be some specific propositional 
content which a speaker， in llsing a metaphor， intencls to coロveyto a hearer. 20 There 
might or might not be such an intenclecl‘content' blt 1 think we shoulcl allow for the 
possibility of a speaker being sllrprised by his own metaphor. There isロoreason why 
the creator of a metaphor ShOlllcl not have to engage in the very same imaginative task 
as the hearer withollt any privilegecl insight into the outcome. 
However， when 1 spoke earlier of the primary intention behind metaphorical lltter-
ance (as being an invitation to unclertake the metaphorical proceclure)， 1 ac1decl the quali-
fication 'at least (in) creative or novel metaphors.' It mLlst be concecled that in the use 
of expressions which are very often called metaphorical a speaker will incleecl have 
primary intentions of just the kincl associated with literal usage. That is， the speaker 
will intencl to convey some specific anc1 recognizable meoning (' propositional content '). 
It is fanciful， ancl surely a mistake， to Sllppose that in Ollr everyclay uses of expressions 
like ‘climbing the social 18clcler，' 'coughing Ip money，' 'being in a clifferent ball-game，' 
‘cloclging the question，' etc. we are cloing anything as elaborate as inviting people to 
unclertake an imaginative task. Each expression has a clefinite meaning and that is 
what we intencl to convey. 
Bllt sllch commonplace 'metaphors' are better characterizecl as iclioms. Their iclio・
matic meaning is as flxecl as any literal meaning. They are sometimes described as 
‘clead' metaphors; metaphors clie from overllse. It is significant that we can， at least 
partially， 'bring alive' a c1eacl metaphor by clrawing attention to its metaphorical origins. 
ThllS if we say 'John is climbing the social laclcler but unfortllnately he has slippecl on 
the top rLlng ancl has taken a nasty fall' we are reviving the original connotations of 
‘ladcler' (precarious clevice， slow step-byもtepascent， etc.). But a truly‘live' metaphor 
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is one not on1y where the connotations are active but one in wbich tle connotations 
have to be worked out. 1n a deacl metaphor or idiom the working out has al been done 
before and the results are common knowleclge. 
The ‘invitation' view of metaphor takes as its paradigm metaphors at the‘live' 
end of the living-clying sca1e which seems to characterize metaphorical use. lf a 
speaker creates a new metaphor， as for example poets strive to clo， he will not expect 
his hearer immediately to grasp some intended meaning. The novelty will draw atten-
tion to the metaphorαs a metαβhol'， as something to be savoured， and of course worked 
out. The primary intention， as with the primary expectation， isthat a hearer will en喝
gage in an imaginative and intellectual process. 
lndeecl， the ‘invitation' view affords a criterion for distinguishing live from dead 
metaphors. To the extent that a speaker can reasonably intend (and expect) a hearer 
to grasp an intencled meaning through knowledge of a conventional usage， the meta嶋
phorical expression will be‘dying' or， to change the figure， will be solidifying into 
idiom. To the extent that a speaker intends a hearer to undertake the metaphorical 
procedure (seeking out connections perhaps for the first time)， to that extent the meta-
phOI・isactive and‘living.' 
What makes a hearer interpret an lltterance metaphorically? 1ロgeneralterms there 
mllst be something arising from the context of lltterance ¥vhich blocks its being taken 
1iterally; norma11y， but as we bave seen not necessarily， this will be the presence of 
some overt semantic oddity in the expression used. There mllst be some reason why 
a hearer (or reader) cannot accept that the speaker (or writer) means what he says; 
the speaker (or writer) will of course endeavour to provide that reason. The possibility 
of communicating metaphorically ¥vith such ease-the recognition that an utterance is 
metaphorical barely requires any consciolls inference to a speaker's intentions-arises 
becallse speaking metaphorically is an estab1ished practice. There are constitutive rules 
for what COllnts as a metaphorica1 utterance (including a‘principle of charity' in inter.・
pretation whereby we try for a metaphorica1 reading before dismissing aロ utterance as 
nonsense) ancl these determine the appropriate ¥vays to respond. 
VIII. Conclusion 
1 have sketched out a theory of metaphor which 0百ersa middle way between emo-
tive (non-cognitivist) and cognitive theories but vihich rejects the semantic framework 
witllin Wllich these are couched. It a1so shows that any outright hostility to metaphor 
in tbe name of trutb is misplaced. Metapllor is no kincl of deceit or concealment， nor 
is ita mere ornament of language. It is an expressive device of a distinctive and val-
uable kind. It works not by mere1y stimulating an emotive or imaginative reaction nor 
by embodying a newly devised semantic or representational content. It is J110re an 
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interaction， sometimes even like a game， between language users. One aim of metaphor 
has been describecl as 'the cultivation of intimacy'; 21 offering ancl working out a 
metaphor is something like telling and enjoying a joke or sharing an ex:perie日ce. It 
is a way of using the resources ot language to pursue and forge connections in the 
mind， perhaps just for fun， perhaps for the most seriollS of encls. The outcome tnight 
be tbe grasp of some preViollsly unthollght proposition， in which case the truth-value 
of that proposition becomes 3I1 issue iηthe assessment of the metaphor. Or it might be 
simply the stretching of the imagination， a seeing of things from a neVl perspective; in 
such cases truth-value is of less irnportance th8n interest or fecundity. 
Monroe Beardsley has saicl that the ex:plication of metaphor is the moclel of al ex-
plication. The theory olltlined in this paper accords ¥vel with the recognized procedures 
for explicating poetry where what matters is not so much the tγω~slαtìon as the exPlo-
ration of meaning. lt also provic!es a [ramework for evaluating the many clifferent 
concerns with metaphor in the other c1isciplines OLl tlinecl in Section I. Although no at-
tempt has been made to ex:plicate any one metaphor the paper has attempted to explore 
the ρoint， as wel as the ρossibiLiか， of metaphor and to fmd the correct location for 
metaphor among other linguistic phenomena. If sLlccessful then at least the philosophical 
task of ‘underlabourer' to the scie口ces wil have been accomplishecl. The empirical 
work on particular metaphorical systems can then begin 
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